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## Japan's Security Policy

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### Conclusions

- Uncertainty remains in the Asia-Pacific region years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Several nations in the region are expanding or modernizing their military capabilities. Continuing tension on the Korean peninsula, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems add, to the region's instability.
- Based on "the National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996", Japan is reshaping its defense capability, but it remains committed to four fundamentals: it maintains an exclusively defense-oriented policy, avoids developing military capabilities that might threaten other countries, adheres to non-nuclear principles, and upholds civilian control of the military.
- The *Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century* in April 1996 reaffirmed the importance of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. The declaration addressed bilateral cooperative efforts designed to increase the credibility of the security relationship and the initiation of a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.
- North Korea's missile launch in August 1998 awakened most Japanese to the military threats facing Japan and stimulated discussion on Guideline-related bills and on the legal issues concerning emergency situations.
- The Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) need to develop joint operational expertise and overall intelligence capabilities for dealing with emergency situations. The SDF also needs to use defense diplomacy to help develop a more stable regional security environment.

### Japan's Basic Defense Policies

Following World War II Japan's Imperial Army and Navy were dissolved, and the old regime was replaced with a democratic government. Article 9 of the new Constitution of Japan renounced war or even possessing combat potential.

However, the Cold War and the Korean War forced Japan to reestablish defensive

capabilities. A constitutional interpretation of Article 9 grants Japan the inherent right of self-defense and the possession of the minimum armed strength needed to exercise that right. The Government of Japan (GOJ) viewpoint has been that building forces to defend the region, even under a collective defense umbrella, exceeds the minimum necessary strength required for the self-defense of Japan.

The GOJ has maintained the SDF, improved its defensive capability, and conducted operations, in accordance with four fundamentals.

**Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy.** This policy means that defense forces cannot be used until an armed attack on Japan is initiated by another country, and that the use of such forces is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense. Moreover, the defense capability of Japan must be limited to the minimum necessary level.

**Not Posing a Military Threat to other Countries.** Japan will not possess, beyond the minimum necessary level for self-defense, military forces strong enough to pose a military threat to other countries.

**Adhering to Three Non-Nuclear Principles.** The three non-nuclear principles include: "not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their introduction in Japan." Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1976, placing itself under obligation, as a non-nuclear weapon state, not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons.

**Ensuring Civilian Control of the Military.** The democratic government maintains control of the military. Due to the regrettable situations in Japan in the pre-World War II era, it has adopted an uncompromising system of civilian controls.

#### **National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996**

Until FY 1995, Japan had been improving its defense capability pursuant to the 1976 "National Defense Program Outline (NDPO)." The SDF has played increasingly diverse roles in dealing with large-scale disasters and contributing towards a more stable security environment by participating in international peace cooperation activities, in addition to its principal mission of defending Japan. The GOJ established the "NDPO in and after FY 1996", to reshape the SDF to effectively conduct the following roles and missions:

**National Defense.** Prevent aggression against Japan and maintain the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. Japan relies upon U.S. nuclear deterrence against the threat of nuclear weapons, yet it actively participates in international efforts for realistic and steady nuclear disarmament, aimed at establishing a world free from nuclear weapons.

Should indirect aggression, or any military activity that might lead to aggression, against Japan occur, the SDF would act to quickly settle the situation.

Should direct aggression occur, the SDF would conduct joint operations, in cooperation with the United States, to quickly repel such aggression.

**Coping with large-scale disasters and various other situations.** In case of large-scale natural disasters, terrorism, or other situations that require the protection of people's lives and assets, the SDF would conduct necessary and timely operations in close cooperation with

related organizations.

Should a situation arise near Japan that would have an important influence on Japan's peace and security, the SDF would act in accordance with the Constitution of Japan by properly supporting UN activities and by coordinating with the United States.

**Contribution to a more stable security environment.** The SDF contributes to international peace efforts by participating in UN Peacekeeping Operations and international disaster relief activities. It promotes confidence-building measures through security dialogues and other defense-related exchange activities with other nations.

Japan cooperates with the UN and other international organizations to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems, as well as to control and regulate conventional weapons.

The SDF is reshaping and strengthening its force structure based on the 1996 NDPO. The enhancement of the Joint Staff Council's functions, and closer relationships among related organizations within the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), are highlighted in the SDF reshaping process. The new force structure of the SDF is shown in Table 1.

### **Comparison of Japan's Defense Expenditure with Other Nations**

Table 2 compares Japanese defense expenditures to those of other major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations. The comparison shows that despite Japan's effort to spend less than one percent of its GDP on defense, it still supports defense at roughly the same total level as America's other major power allies (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.)

### **Reaffirmation of U.S.-Japan Arrangements**

Japan and the United States have worked closely to increase the credibility of the bilateral alliance. The results of this cooperation were published in the *Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century*, which was signed by former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President William Clinton on April 17, 1996.

The Joint Declaration reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. security relationship remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives and maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region for the 21st century. It addressed the following:

- Enhancement of the exchange of information and views on the international situation, and consultation on defense policies and military postures;
- A review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, and studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan;
- Further cooperation based on the Japan-U.S. agreement concerning the reciprocal provision of logistics support, supplies, and services between the SDF and the U.S. Forces;

- Enhancement of the mutual exchange of technology and equipment; ar
- Prevention of the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems and cooperation in the ongoing study on ballistic missile defense.

**Table 1 - SDF's Force Structure**

	<b>Classification</b>	<b>1976 NDPO</b>	<b>Current NDPO</b>
<b>GSDF</b>	<b>SDF Personnel</b>	180,000	160,000
	<b>Major Units</b>		
	Regionally Deployed		
	Divisions	12	8
	Brigades	2	6
	Mobile Operation		
	Armored Division	1	1
	Airborne Brigade	1	1
	Helicopter Brigade	1	1
	Ground-to-Air Missile		
	Anti-aircraft Groups	8	8
	<b>Main Equipment</b>		
	Tanks (Approx.)	1,200	900
	Artillery (Approx.)	1,000	900
<b>MSDF</b>			
	<b>Major Units</b>		
	Destroyer Flotillas	4	4
	(For Mobile Operations)		

The Joint Declaration also stated that the two governments will strive to achieve a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. It recognizes that U.S. engagement in the region, supported by the U.S.-Japan security relationship, constitutes the foundation for such efforts. With regard to global cooperation, the Joint Declaration referred to the two governments' cooperation in support of the UN and other international organizations through peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, and to their coordination on such issues as arms control and disarmament.

#### **Guidelines Review and Legislation of the Guidelines-Related Bills**

The 1996 Joint Declaration provided for a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation to enhance the credibility of the bilateral security relationship. These review activities were conducted by the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation, which consists of Japanese bureau directors and U.S. assistant secretaries, under a Japan-U.S. ministerial/secretarial level committee, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC). After a 15-month review, the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation were approved and published by the SCC on September 23, 1997. The aims of the new guidelines are:

- To create a solid basis for

(For mobile operations)		
Destroyer Divisions	10	7
(Regional District Units)		
Submarine Divisions	6	6
Minesweeping Flotillas	2	1
Land-based Patrol		
Aircraft Squadrons	16	13
Main Equipment		
Destroyers (Approx.)	60	50
Submarines	16	16
Combat Aircraft (Approx.)	220	170

#### ASDF

Major Units		
Aircraft Control and	28	8 +
Warning Groups		20 Squadrons
Airborne Early		
Warning Squadron	1	1
Interceptor Squadrons	10	9
Support Fighter Squadrons	3	3
Air Recon Squadron	1	1
Air Transport Squadrons	3	3
Ground-to-Air Missile		
Groups	6	6
Main Equipment		
Fighter/Combat		
Aircraft (Approx.)	430	400
(Fighter Aircraft only)		
(Approx.)	350	300

more effective and credible U.S.-Japan cooperation in peace, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security.

- To provide a general framework and policy direction for the roles and missions of the two countries and ways of cooperating and coordinating, both in peacetime and during contingencies.

The 1997 Guidelines and programs under the Guidelines are consistent with the following basic premises and principles:

- The rights and obligation under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements, as well as the fundamental framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance, will remain unchanged.
- Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of its Constitution and in accordance with its four fundamental principles.

The 1997 Guidelines detail Japan-U.S. cooperation matters regarding (1) normal circumstances, (2) actions in response to an armed attack against Japan, and (3) situations in areas surrounding Japan. Information sharing and policy consultation, various types of security cooperation, and bilateral programs are highlighted for cooperation under normal circumstances. Operations in case of an armed attack against Japan are also addressed in the 1997

(Note: GSDF: Ground Self-Defense Force, MSDF: Maritime Self-Defense Force, ASDF: Air Self Defense Force)

#### Guidelines.

The Guidelines clarify what Japan can do in situations in areas surrounding Japan in order to enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. The Guidelines address the following fields of cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan:

- Cooperation in activities initiated by either Government (relief activities regarding refugees, search and rescue operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions);
- Japan's support for U.S. Forces activities (use of facilities by U.S. Forces, rear area support); and,
- Japan-U.S. operational cooperation (surveillance, minesweeping, sea and airspace management).

The GOJ laid the Guidelines-related bills before the Diet last year in order to ensure the effectiveness of the 1997 Guidelines by authorizing the SDF to conduct necessary cooperative activities. The lower house has approved the legislation and the upper house approval is expected soon.

#### **Some Future Prospects**

The Defense Guidelines Review and Guidelines-related legislation will facilitate the credibility of the bilateral defense cooperation. The JDA also fosters defense diplomacy through bilateral and multilateral security dialogues and several kinds of defense-related exchanges, especially with nations in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan will continue its defense diplomacy and maintain its strategic bilateral tie with the United States.

**Table 2 - Defense Expenditures  
of Major Nations  
(FY1996)**

Country	Defense Expenditure (million dollars)	Per capita Defense Expenditure (dollars)	Ratio of Defense Expenditure to GDP (%)
U.S.A.	253,187	953	3.4
U.K.	31,600	537	2.9
France	28,858	495	2.4
Germany	23,530	287	1.4
Japan	28,009	223	0.98

Note: 1. Defense expenditures are based on the budget statements, defense reports and other documents of each country. Purchasing power parities published by OECD were used in conversion into the U.S. dollar (US\$1=0.678 pounds=6.57 francs=2.05marks=173yen).  
2. Population and GDP are based on reference materials of each country.

The North Korean three-stage missile launch over Japan in August 1998 will probably result in additional legislation on emergency situations. At the same time, the SDF will develop its joint operational capability and its bilateral operational cooperation with the U.S. Armed Forces. The JDA is increasing resources to improve intelligence capabilities and its dissemination of reliable, timely products to SDF and GOJ customers.

Instability and uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region will exist into the foreseeable future. Japan is likely to reformulate its security strategy and defense policies to reduce the threats posed by WMD and their delivery systems. Tokyo will continue to cultivate a more peaceful and stable security environment in the region.

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